Darren Patterson Christian Acad. v. Roy, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01557-DDD-STV (February 24, 2025) Holding: The federal district court enjoined the state executives charged with overseeing the universal preschool program from expelling, punishing, withholding funds from, or otherwise disciplining plaintiff Darren Patterson Christian Academy under the universal preschool program on the basis that plaintiff's policies violate the program's statutory or contractual anti-discrimination provisions. Case Summary: In 2020, Colorado voters approved proposition EE, establishing a dedicated source of funding for statewide preschool. The general assembly enacted implementing legislation in 2022. The universal preschool program, §§ 26.5-4-201 to 26.5-4-211, C.R.S, is a program that allows certain preschoolers to attend the preschool of their choice for free. Plaintiff Darren Patterson Christian Academy is a private, Christian preschool participating in the program. As a condition of participating, schools like plaintiff must agree not to discriminate on the basis of a number of statutes, including religion, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Pursuant to its faith, however, plaintiff refuses to hire employees who do not share its faith and requires its staff and students to abide by certain policies determined by biological sex rather than gender identity. After agreeing to participate in the program, plaintiff raised concerns with the two state executives in the Department of Early Childhood charged with overseeing the universal preschool program that plaintiff's religious policies may run afoul of the state's nondiscrimination requirements. But the state executives refused to grant plaintiff an exemption to the nondiscrimination requirements. In 2023, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado preliminarily enjoined the state executives, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any others who are in active concert or participation with any of them from expelling, punishing, withholding funds from, or otherwise disciplining plaintiff under the universal preschool program on the basis that plaintiff's policies, as alleged in the verified complaint, violate the program's statutory or contractual anti-discrimination provisions. The court has now made the injunction permanent. Because § 26.5-4-205 permits exceptions in the discretion of the government, but the government refuses to allow an exception to accommodate plaintiff's sincere religious beliefs, the statute is not neutral as a matter of law. League of Women Voters v. Brd. of Comm'rs, Colorado Supreme Court No. 23SC394 (February 24, 2025) Holding: The Supreme Court held that the county‐commissioner redistricting statutes, §§ 30-10-306 to 306.4, C.R.S., (1) imply a private right of action; (2) confer standing on individual county voters and voter‐focused organizations to enforce those statutes; and (3) apply as mandatory duties to home rule counties. Accordingly, Weld County’s Board of County Commissioners must complete its commissioner‐district redistricting process in accordance with the county‐commissioner redistricting statutes in time for the 2026 election. Case Summary: In March 2023, Weld County’s Board of County Commissioners (Board) approved a new county commissioner redistricting map without complying with the procedures set forth in sections §§ 30-10-306 to 306.4, C.R.S., (redistricting statutes) asserting that, as a home rule county, Weld County was exempt from the redistricting statutes. Two registered voters and two nonprofit organizations sued the Board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Board to comply with the redistricting statutes. The district court granted summary judgment and, upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review. On appeal, the Court first determined that although the redistricting statutes do not expressly create a private enforcement mechanism, the legislative history and statutory design of the redistricting statutes demonstrate an implicit right of action for the class the statutes were meant to protect—county voters—and that an implied civil remedy is consistent with the redistricting statutes’ purposes. Next, it held that the plaintiffs' deprivation of the procedural safeguards mandated by the redistricting statutes constituted an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest under established standing doctrine. Lastly, the Court rejected the Board's home rule exemption argument. The Court held that, while home rule charters govern a county's internal "structure," they do not displace statutorily required county "functions"—and redistricting duties are required county functions. The Court reversed only the portion of the district court's order permitting the continued use of the 2015 redistricting map, and remanded with instructions to require the Board to adopt a redistricting map that complies with the redistricting statutes for the 2026 county commissioner election. People v. Mena, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA0563 (February 6, 2025) Holding: Defendant was convicted of both unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child under § 18-3-404 (1.5) and sexual assault on a child under § 18-3-405 (1) for the identical conduct, but the potential penalty for unlawful sexual contact by coercion provides for a harsher penalty, namely requiring a mandatory prison sentence. Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, the conviction for unlawful contact by coercion must be vacated and the defendant sentenced for sexual assault on a child. Case Summary: The defendant was found guilty of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child and of sexual assault on a child (SAOC). The defendant was charged and convicted under § 18-3-404 (1.5) of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child by the means set forth in § 18-3-402 (1)(d) because, at the time of the commission of the act, the victim was younger than fifteen years old and the defendant was more than four years older than the victim and was not the victim's spouse. Unlawful sexual contact is a class 4 felony that carries a mandatory prison sentence. The defendant was also charged and convicted of SAOC under § 18-3-405 because the defendant knowingly subjected another not his spouse to sexual contact and the victim was less than fifteen years of age and the defendant was at least four years older than the victim. SAOC is a class 4 felony but does not require a mandatory sentence of imprisonment. Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, a defendant's rights are violated when two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that conduct more harshly. The court recognized that, as the defendant was charged in this case, SAOC and unlawful sexual contact both have the same age and relationship requirements. The only difference between the two is that SAOC requires sexual contact, while unlawful sexual contact can be accomplished either with unlawful sexual contact or upon the child exposing her intimate parts. Thus, the court found that, as applied to the defendant in this case, unlawful sexual contact prohibits either the exact same conduct or less egregious conduct as SAOC, but it carries a mandatory prison sentence, while the crime with the more egregious result, SAOC, does not. The court held that the disparate punishments for the defendant in this case for unlawful sexual contact and SAOC were a violation of the defendant's rights under Colorado's equal protection doctrine.
