Courts presume that the General Assembly is aware of court decisions that construe state statutes or the constitution. The Office of Legislative Legal Services will update this page on an ongoing basis and email legislators quarterly to notify the General Assembly of such court decisions. Cases that may be of particular interest because they meet certain criteria have been summarized and are listed below in chronological order of decision date. Summaries for cases older than a year are available in the Cases of Note Archive. MetroPCS Cal., LLC v. Lakewood, Colorado Supreme Court No. 24SA178 (September 8, 2025) Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the City of Lakewood's 1996 and 2015 ordinances amending its business and occupation tax constituted "new taxes" under the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR). Because Lakewood failed to obtain voter approval prior to enacting these ordinances, both are void and unenforceable. Case Summary: In 1969, the City of Lakewood enacted a business and occupation tax specifically levied against utility companies maintaining telephone exchanges and lines within the city. In 1996 and 2015, Lakewood enacted ordinances amending this tax, without first seeking voter approval. The 1996 Ordinance expanded the tax to include providers of cellular services if that service was the recipient's primary local telecommunications service. The 2015 Ordinance further expanded the definition of taxable services to include all cellular, mobile, or wireless voice services provided to any entity. Following an audit in which Lakewood sought over $1.6 million in unpaid taxes from MetroPCS, MetroPCS challenged the ordinances, arguing that they violated TABOR. Under TABOR, districts must have advance voter approval for any "new tax" from which the revenue gained is not both “incidental and de minimis.” First, the Court considered whether the ordinances constituted a “new tax.” The Court concluded that the expansion of an existing tax to a previously untaxed class of goods or activities is a “new tax.” While the 1969 Ordinance was expressly limited to utility companies with physical infrastructure, the subsequent ordinances expanded the tax scope to reach a broader class of providers and services. Thus, the Court held that both of the ordinances created a new tax. Second, having held that both the 1996 and 2015 ordinances were a “new tax,” the Court next considered whether the ordinances required prior voter approval. A “new tax” that results in incidental and de minimis revenue gain does not require prior voter approval pursuant to TABOR. Although the ordinances did not express revenue generation as a purpose, the Court looked to the effected purposes of the ordinances. Considering both that Lakewood could have achieved the stated purposes of the ordinances without increasing taxes and that the ordinances only added new tax liability and did not remove tax liability, the Court concluded that revenue generation was not merely an incidental outcome. Consequently, the Court held that the ordinances violated TABOR’s requirement for voter approval. Because the revenue increase resulting from the ordinances was not incidental, the Court did not need to determine whether the revenue increase was de minimis. Randolph v. People, Colorado Supreme Court No. 23SC167 (June 23, 2025) Holding: The culpable mental state of soliciting for child prostitution under sections 18-7-402 (1)(a) and (1)(b) is knowingly. Case Summary: The defendant was charged with two counts of soliciting for child prostitution, in violation of sections 18-7-402 (1)(a) and (1)(b) (subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b)). Subsection (1)(a) proscribes soliciting another "for the purpose of prostitution" of or by a child, and subsection (1)(b) proscribes arranging or offering to arrange a meeting of persons "for the purpose of prostitution" of or by a child. The trial court instructed the jury that the required mens rea for the charged offenses is "knowingly." The defendant was convicted and he appealed, arguing that the district court had improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea of the charges. In various prior cases, divisions of the court of appeals have disagreed on whether the mens rea required for subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) is "intentionally" or "knowingly." The court acknowledged that neither subsection (1)(a) nor subsection (1)(b) includes any of the four terms the General Assembly has selected to ordinarily define culpable mental states in Colorado (intent, knowing, recklessness, and criminal negligence), but both subsections include the phrase "for the purpose of." The defendant argued that "for the purpose of" is a culpable mental state. The court disagreed, determining that had the legislature meant to designate "for the purpose of" as the mens rea instead of one of the four ordinary culpable mental states, it would have made its intent to do so clear. Instead, the court found that "subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are simply mum on a culpable mental state." Recognizing that legislative silence on a culpable mental does not indicate that no culpable mental state is required, the court held that the required mens rea is "knowingly." The court determined that subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) proscribe certain conduct when it is accompanied by a particular attendant circumstance, but the subsections do not require a particular result. The culpable mental state of knowingly is defined in terms of conduct, and/or the attendant circumstances, and/or the result of the offense. The culpable mental state of intentionally is defined only in terms of the result of the offense. The court rejected recklessness and criminal negligence as possibilities because nothing in the language of subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) is logically tied to either. Therefore, the court held, "knowingly" is the culpable mental state that best fits in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b). Ams. for Prosperity v. Colorado, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 24CA1066 (May 1, 2025) Holding: Opinion of initiative proponent regarding voter intent does not govern court's construction of an initiated statute or create an issue of fact regarding the proper interpretation of that statute that precludes a grant of summary judgment. Because section 24-77-108, C.R.S., requires voter approval of a newly created enterprise only if the enterprise and any other enterprises created either simultaneously or within the preceding five years that serve primarily the same purpose have projected aggregate revenue exceeding $100 million from fees and surcharges in the first five fiscal years, the creation of multiple enterprises without voter approval by Senate Bill 21-260 did not violate that section when the enterprises did not serve primarily the same purpose and did not in any individual case exceed $100 million in such revenue. The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, article X, section 20 of the state constitution, did not require the General Assembly, which had reduced the voter-approved excess state revenues cap in 2017, to obtain voter approval to increase the cap back up to the amount approved by the voters. Senate Bill 21-260 did not violate the single subject requirement of article V, section 21 of the state constitution because the bill's creation of four new enterprises, expansion of a fifth enterprise, and increase of the excess state revenues cap to the full voter-approved amount all supported the bill's single subject of ensuring the sustainability of Colorado's transportation system. Case Summary: In 2021, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 21-260, titled "Concerning the sustainability of the transportation system in Colorado ..." (SB 260). Among other things, the bill: (1) expanded the purview of the statewide bridge enterprise in the department of transportation (CDOT) to include tunnel projects and renamed it as the statewide bridge and tunnel enterprise; (2) created the community access enterprise in the Colorado energy office, the clean fleet enterprise in the department of public health and environment, the clean transit enterprise in CDOT, and the nonattainment area air pollution mitigation enterprise in CDOT; and (3) Restored the state excess state revenues cap (cap), which is the amount of revenue subject to The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, article X, section 20 of the state constitution (TABOR) that the state may annually retain and spend and which the General Assembly had voluntarily reduced in Senate Bill 17-267 (SB 267), from the amount authorized by the voters of the state in 2005 back to the full voter-approved amount. The General Assembly did not refer all or any part of SB 260 to the voters for approval. In April 2022, plaintiff Americans for Prosperity (AFP) filed a lawsuit in Denver District Court alleging, in addition to other issues not also raised on appeal, that SB 260 violated: (1) Section 24-77-108, C.R.S., which requires voter approval for any new enterprise that generates more than $100 million in revenue from fees and surcharges in its first five fiscal years and further requires that "[r]evenue collected for enterprises created simultaneously or within the five preceding years serving primarily the same purpose [] be aggregated" when determining whether the voter approval requirement applies, because the enterprises created and expanded by the bill serve primarily the same purpose, had combined fees and surcharge revenue in their first five fiscal years of more than $100 million and were not referred to and approved by the voters; (2) Article V, section 21 of the state constitution, which requires every bill to have a single subject because first, the five enterprises created by or expanded in the bill serve different purposes, and second, the increase in the cap is distinct from the sustainability of the transportation system in Colorado; and (3) TABOR because the increase in the excess state revenues cap required voter approval. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 29, 2024, the Denver District Court issued an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing all of AFP's claims, and AFP appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in its entirety. First, the court rejected AFP's argument that for purposes of determining whether section 24-77-108 requires voter approval of an enterprise, the phrase "serving primarily the same purpose" in section 24-77-108 (2), C.R.S., should be interpreted as applying only to the phrase "within the five preceding fiscal years" so that aggregation of revenue of all enterprises created simultaneously is required regardless of whether those enterprises serve primarily the same purpose. The court instead concluded that section 24-77-108, C.R.S. "only requires voter approval of newly created enterprises when they (1) are created simultaneously or within the preceding five years; (2) serve the same purpose; and (3) have a projected aggregate revenue exceeding $100 million from fees and surcharges in their first five years. Applying these criteria to the enterprises created by SB 260, the court held that voter approval was not required because the parties did not dispute that the enterprises served different purposes and because no individual enterprise had first five-year projected fee and surcharge revenue in excess of $100 million. The court next rejected AFP's argument that the General Assembly's voluntary decision in 2017 to reduce the cap bound the state to that reduced cap in the future absent additional voter approval to increase it. Instead, the court noted that such an interpretation of TABOR would have the effect of discouraging the General Assembly from displaying fiscal prudence by voluntarily reducing the cap, concluded that the reduction had no impact on the higher cap previously approved by the voters and therefore held that SB 260 did not violate TABOR by restoring the cap to the maximum voter-approved level without further voter approval. Finally, the court rejected AFP's argument that SB 260 had multiple subjects because it created or expanded five enterprises that served different purposes and increased the cap in a bill intended to ensure the sustainability of the transportation system in Colorado. Instead, the court held that SB 260 had a single subject because the differing purposes of the five enterprises, which it summarized as "(1) community-level electric vehicle adoption, (2) electrification of motor vehicle fleets; (3) electrification of public transit vehicles; (4) reduction of air pollution in nonattainment areas; and (5) completion of bridge and tunnel projects" all "undoubtedly concern ... the sustainability of Colorado's transportation system" and because it agreed with the district court that increasing the cap directly relates to SB 260's goal of "creat[ing] new sources of dedicated funding in connection with sustaining Colorado's transportation system." League of Women Voters v. Brd. of Comm'rs, Colorado Supreme Court No. 23SC394 (February 24, 2025) Holding: The Supreme Court held that the county‐commissioner redistricting statutes, §§ 30-10-306 to 306.4, C.R.S., (1) imply a private right of action; (2) confer standing on individual county voters and voter‐focused organizations to enforce those statutes; and (3) apply as mandatory duties to home rule counties. Accordingly, Weld County’s Board of County Commissioners must complete its commissioner‐district redistricting process in accordance with the county‐commissioner redistricting statutes in time for the 2026 election. Case Summary: In March 2023, Weld County’s Board of County Commissioners (Board) approved a new county commissioner redistricting map without complying with the procedures set forth in sections §§ 30-10-306 to 306.4, C.R.S., (redistricting statutes) asserting that, as a home rule county, Weld County was exempt from the redistricting statutes. Two registered voters and two nonprofit organizations sued the Board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Board to comply with the redistricting statutes. The district court granted summary judgment and, upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review. On appeal, the Court first determined that although the redistricting statutes do not expressly create a private enforcement mechanism, the legislative history and statutory design of the redistricting statutes demonstrate an implicit right of action for the class the statutes were meant to protect—county voters—and that an implied civil remedy is consistent with the redistricting statutes’ purposes. Next, it held that the plaintiffs' deprivation of the procedural safeguards mandated by the redistricting statutes constituted an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest under established standing doctrine. Lastly, the Court rejected the Board's home rule exemption argument. The Court held that, while home rule charters govern a county's internal "structure," they do not displace statutorily required county "functions"—and redistricting duties are required county functions. The Court reversed only the portion of the district court's order permitting the continued use of the 2015 redistricting map, and remanded with instructions to require the Board to adopt a redistricting map that complies with the redistricting statutes for the 2026 county commissioner election. People v. Mena, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA0563 (February 6, 2025) Holding: Defendant was convicted of both unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child under § 18-3-404 (1.5) and sexual assault on a child under § 18-3-405 (1) for the identical conduct, but the potential penalty for unlawful sexual contact by coercion provides for a harsher penalty, namely requiring a mandatory prison sentence. Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, the conviction for unlawful contact by coercion must be vacated and the defendant sentenced for sexual assault on a child. Case Summary: The defendant was found guilty of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child and of sexual assault on a child (SAOC). The defendant was charged and convicted under § 18-3-404 (1.5) of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child by the means set forth in § 18-3-402 (1)(d) because, at the time of the commission of the act, the victim was younger than fifteen years old and the defendant was more than four years older than the victim and was not the victim's spouse. Unlawful sexual contact is a class 4 felony that carries a mandatory prison sentence. The defendant was also charged and convicted of SAOC under § 18-3-405 because the defendant knowingly subjected another not his spouse to sexual contact and the victim was less than fifteen years of age and the defendant was at least four years older than the victim. SAOC is a class 4 felony but does not require a mandatory sentence of imprisonment. Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, a defendant's rights are violated when two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that conduct more harshly. The court recognized that, as the defendant was charged in this case, SAOC and unlawful sexual contact both have the same age and relationship requirements. The only difference between the two is that SAOC requires sexual contact, while unlawful sexual contact can be accomplished either with unlawful sexual contact or upon the child exposing her intimate parts. Thus, the court found that, as applied to the defendant in this case, unlawful sexual contact prohibits either the exact same conduct or less egregious conduct as SAOC, but it carries a mandatory prison sentence, while the crime with the more egregious result, SAOC, does not. The court held that the disparate punishments for the defendant in this case for unlawful sexual contact and SAOC were a violation of the defendant's rights under Colorado's equal protection doctrine.
